Civil War in Ulster

Chapter 1: Introduction- Objective in Writing

It is stated by responsible politicians that if the project of granting Home Rule to Ireland is persisted in, the result will be civil war in Ulster.

Public meetings have been held, addressed by Members of Parliament, and even members of former administrations, in which people have been told that the preservation of their civil and religious liberties will probably require a resort to arms. Rifles and bayonets have been imported, where it has been possible to avoid the vigilance of the Customs authorities, and placed at the disposal of certain political societies; drilling has been openly indulged in, while what is intended as the future Provisional Government has already assembled.

Almost the whole of the press on one side reports these proceedings with approval, and occasionally publishes leaders warning the authorities of the crisis that will be precipitated if any attempt is made to interfere with them. (see Appendix)

By a document which was circulated on rather short notice in almost all the Protestant Churches last year, the support of the leaders of religion has been obtained in advance (1).

The consequence is that civil war is placed before the country as something so much of the nature of an obvious duty on the part of anyone who disapproves of the Home Rule Bill or any of its provisions, that nobody pauses to consider if it is really necessary, if it is likely to succeed, and what its consequences will be.

These are comparatively trifling details to leaders whose connection with Ulster mainly consists in running down from Dublin or London once or twice a year to address political meetings there, or more recently to inspect guards of honour, but the matter is one of vital importance for the writer (2), whose home happens to be in a district which is likely to be a centre of whatever disturbance there may be, and who has hitherto managed to live in peace and harmony with his neighbours, without regard to their religion or politics, as have most of his relatives, some of whom are now being supplied with arms, and instigated to kill or get killed in whatever manner may seem most conducive to bringing about a change of Ministry.

He, therefore, proposes to consider a few of the reasons usually given in justification of a resort to force, and some of the consequences that will probably ensue if this happens, in the hope that by this means something may be done to clear the political atmosphere, and that, if there is a civil war, those who take part in it may at least know what they are fighting for, and what results they are likely to bring about by doing so.

So great is the power of the phrase maker that probably the expression rendered famous by Lord Randolph Churchill, when he informed the world that 'Ulster will fight and Ulster will be right,' would be considered by the ordinary man a full and complete answer on all the points I have suggested.

It is, however, even more dangerous to put one's trust in phrases than in princes, and Palmerston's brilliant epigram that tenant right meant landlord wrong conduced to a superficial treatment of one of the most serious of Irish problems, which was the cause of untold misery in Ulster as well as the other parts of the country.

A blind assumption of the correctness of the principle laid down in the other phrase may lead to consequences even more disastrous, and it will be one of my principal objects, instead of taking the truth of this proposition for granted, to examine the grounds on which it is based.

It will probably be conceded that there are some things which, while desirable in themselves, may be purchased at too high a price, and that war, and especially civil war, is such a very high price, that the advantages to be obtained, or the disadvantages to be avoided, would have to be of an overwhelming nature in order to justify it.

A great many people do not like the Insurance Act, but nobody dreams of heading a revolt on account of it. The English Nonconformists did not like Mr Balfour's Education Bill, but they confined themselves to passive resistance, and most of them have tired even of that.

The South African Republics look better when painted red on the map than they did in their former colours, but there is considerable misgiving as to whether the change was worth £250,000,000 and 20,000 lives.

The advantages of retaining the present system of government in Ireland, assuming it can be retained indefinitely, the difficulties of which will appear later on, would have to be very great indeed, and the drawbacks of the system proposed to be substituted to be of a most serious character, before a resort to arms if seriously intended would be justifiable.

If not seriously intended, and the whole thing is a mere attempt to frighten the British electors by threats which there is no intention of putting into execution, (then) the conduct of those who would deceive their followers in Ireland, in order that they may deceive the public in Great Britain, would seem too reprehensible for belief, were it not that it has acknowledged precedents in connection with the same question.

The biography of Lord Randolph Churchill shows that while he was repeating on the platform 'Ulster will fight and Ulster will be right', in his letters to Lord Salisbury he described this course as playing the Orange card, and having by the help of the Orange card got his party and himself into office, he had no hesitation in recommending a policy of governing Ireland through the instrumentality of the Catholic Bishops.

In view of the fact that political leaders, however much they may find it desirable to talk about taking their followers into their confidence, cannot do so without showing their hand to the other side, and consequently risking their game, even if their projects were always such as would secure the approval and co-operation of their supporters, it is necessary sometimes to take their statements with a certain amount of salt, sometimes to read between the lines of them, and sometimes to consider what is unsaid rather than what is said.

There is the further difficulty expressed by the proverb, that it is easier to raise the devil than to lay him, that in spite of the fact that the Covenant was so worked as to surrender practically into the hands of one man the right of private judgment on the part of those who signed it, his control over his followers may prove to be imperfect, and the latter having got arms in their hands may proceed to use them without orders, or in a manner for which they will find few apologists in the House of Commons.

There is, it seems to me, a good deal more risk of anarchy than of civil war, but as the consequences of this would be even more mischievous, this circumstance affords small consolation.

There exists, however, plenty of good feeling and commonsense in the province, if it could only find a voice, which I hope it will, if I succeed in showing any considerable section of the population even a glimpse of the dangers in which they are likely to be involved, if the threat to resist Home Rule by force of arms is carried out.

Fortunately, or perhaps unfortunately, nobody in Ulster nowadays has any conception of the horrors of war, and above all, of civil war. Yet a very scant acquaintance with history, or even a casual reading of the recent newspapers, will show anyone that these horrors are very real and very great.

Apart from all question of the loss of life in action, any war involves much expenditure of money, great destruction of property, and cessation of, or very grave interference with, the commercial and industrial life of the nations engaged in it; in addition to all this a civil war involves the temporary destruction or paralysis of the institutions of government. In the state of affairs that ensues, the worst elements of the population find occasion to gratify their most criminal instincts.

Neither life, property, nor female honour is safe. The leaders of the Ulster movement may think that they have their men under complete control and discipline, but the whole teaching of history goes to show that you cannot overthrow the settled institutions of government without giving free rein, at any rate for a time, to the forces of disorder.

In addition to all this, religion has been so mixed up with politics in the discussion of this question, that riots among the lower classes are bound to break out, and a sort of 'civil and religious' warfare will reinforce the elements of hooliganism which exist in every community.

Consequently, when we are told that civil war is the only alternative to accepting the Home Rule Bill, and that Ulster has made up its mind it will have the former rather than the latter, it is scarcely worth while to inquire whether of the two evils Ulster is really choosing the lesser, and whether her choice may not result in her obtaining both, and in a very aggravated form, since the position of those who have taken to arms unsuccessfully is necessarily for some time very unpleasant.

The real truth seems to be that the horrors of civil war are entirely ignored, or, at any rate largely minimised, and the evils ensuing from the acceptance of the Home Rule Bill by Ulster are exaggerated beyond all reasonable limits.

My own opinion is that if Ulster appeals to force, she will do more harm to herself than the Home Rule Bill could possibly do if it were ten times as bad as it is represented to be. With the analogies that are usually supposed to justify this course I shall deal in the following chapter.

Notes and References Ch 1
1. I have not managed to track down this document; I would welcome a reference to a source. RJ.

2. JJ's family was then living near Dungannon, a mixed district. RJ.


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Copyright Dr Roy Johnston 1998